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The unintended consequences of the arbitration 
system 
Pat Walsh* and Geoff Fougere** 
Eight years ago Jin1 Holt. Erik ~Otssen and the t\vo authors of this paper 1net 'together over a 
long and relaxed dinner. Jin1 was in Christchurch to work on the McCu'llough diaries~ as it 
turned out, an in1p0'11ant source in writing. Co1npulsory' arbit~ation in Nel'v Zealand. Erik ~Oissen 
'\\'as doing paral'lel work on the Red Feds. Pat Walsh, as an analyst of industrial relations had a 
direct intcre~t in labour history \Vhile ~Geoff Fougere's intere t lay rno:re generally in Ne\v 
Zealand political econon1y. At different tin1es. all four of us had been graduate students in the 
United States. The n1ix of shared and differing interests n1adc for a pleasurable evening. Talk 
ranged \videly over issues in Ne\v Zealand society .. relationships bet\\'een social science and 
hi tOI)' and the peculiarities of Ne\\' Zealand acaden1ic life. In its O\Vn way. this paper is a 
continuation of that conversation. 
Jin1's article. ·"The political origins of con1pulsOI)' arhitration in Nevl Zealand: a cotnpari-
son \Vith ~Great Britain· (HoH. 1976) had intrigued and excited us. It often seetns to social 
scientists that historians have a love affair \Vith narrative ~vh ich precludes the search for causal 
and structural explanations. But here \vas an analysis that explicitly delineat~ed the roles of 
state and societal actors and used co1nparison to explain why con1pulsory arbitration had been 
introduced into Ne\v Zealand but not in Britain. As such it re:n1ains the definitive account. The 
book successfully carries the argun1ent further v.rhile developing its substance. 
In dealing \Vith the book. \Ve \\rant to recast Ho1Cs account in a n1ore explicitl) theor~etical 
\Vay. Our principle concerns are the relations an1ong state officials and politicians'\ and class 
and sectoral organizations of\a.'orkers. e1nployers and farn1ers. 1 We \Vill u e Holt's account to 
shovl ho\v. in certain circun1stances. · tates can decisively tructure the resources available for 
the n1obilisation of int~erests in civil soci ~ety and ho\v this in tun1 shapes tate policy and 
organization. We \vil1 also con1rnent on the interplay of narrative and analysis in the explan-
ation of events that happen over tin1e. 
Social scientists and historians have again becon1e interested in the question of state 
structure, state actors and state capaciti ~es. This interest has recast don1 in ant theories -rnarxist 
and liberal both- and revived neglected tra,ditions of state centred analysis. drawing particu-
larly on Weber. Hintze and de Tocqueville.- In contrast t.o their n1arxist and liberal alterna-
tives. state centred approaches grant tl,e po~sibility of autonon1ous action to state officials. 
They also atten1 pt to analyse the in1pact. of state structure on the fonnation and developrnent of 
social groups. In this view. as Skocpol ( 1985. p. 21) puts it: 
•• 
states n1atter not sin1ply because of the goal ori~ented activities of state officials. They matter 
because their organizational ~configurations along with their overall patten;1s of activity 
affect political culture. encourage son1e kinds of group fonnation and collective political 
actions (but not others) and nHlke possible the raising of certain political issues (but not 
others) .. . the structures and activities of states unintentionally innuence the forn1ation of 
groups and the political capacities. ideas nnd de:n1ands of various sectors of society. 
Senior Lecturer I.ndustrial Relations Centre. Victoria Univcrsit)' of Wellington. 
Senior Lecturer. Depart1nent ofCon1munity Health. Wellington School of Medicine . 
This paper was ·wrinen jointly~ the order of authorship was detern1ined by flipping a coin. 
I ln looking at state officials we focus upon the n1en1bers of the Arbitration Court. Also in1portan1 
were Departn1ent of Labour officials. On this see. \\' illian1~ ( 1977). 
2 For an overvie" see Skocpol T (19X5) 
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In discussing Holt's book we will. like hin1~ concentrate equally on the ·goal oriented 
activities of state officials' in the creation and maintenance of the arbitration system and on its 
unintended innuence on. ~the fo:rn1ation of groups and the political capacities. ideas and 
dernands of various sectors of society'. and in turn the latter's influence on state officials and 
sta tc st ruct u rc. 
Creating the system 
We begin not \Vith Holt but \Vith the political scientist .. Francis Castles. In a provocative but 
historically na,ved book. Castles n1akes compulsory arbitration of pivotal importance to the 
developn1ent of social and econon1ic policy in New Zealand and Australia (Castles. 1985).3 
According to Castles. the arbitration syste·tn shaped the social and economic policy prefer-
ences of unions in each countl)'. In tum this contributed to the particular trajectory of 
Australasian \vel fare state development: policy leadership around the turn of the century~ 
divergent paths in the 1930s and the shared status of\\'elfare state laggards in the period after 
the second world war. (l'hc latter characterisation is entirely accurate but not widely recog-
nised in Ne\\' Zealand - as shown by conten1porary debate on the future of the welfare 
state). 
Castles· analysis of the political and industrial coalitions that led to the IC&A Act differs 
strikingly fron1 Holt's. According to Castles. the period 1890-1910 was characterised b)' work-
ing class strength outside of parliatnent but lin1ited influenoe \Vithin Parliament. Holt·s 
argun1cnt is the reverse. According to Holt. unions had al"'ays been weakly organized except 
for a brief flurry behveen 1889 and 1890. Defeat in the Maritim·e Strike confirmed rather than 
contradicted this situation. I ndu, trial \\'eakness tneant that unions saw arbitration as offering 
then1 benefits they could not \Vin through their own industrial ·efforts but could secure through 
their coalition partnership \Vithin the Liberal governn1enl. Thus it was the precise 111ix of 
industrial v.'eakness coupled with political innut!nce that explains the union stance - a 
configuration that Castles explicitly rules out as. ·n1ost in1probable on theoretical grounds· 
( 19R5. p. 6 ). 
Castles and Holt arc in agreen1ent in their discussion of potential sources of parlian1entary 
and e.xtra-parlian1entar)' opposition to cornpulsory arbitration. According to both .. the diver-
gent stances of rural and urban property O\\'ners deprived conservative critics of their ability to 
block the Liberals~ progre sive legislation. including the IC&A Act. To urban en1ployers. the 
Act threatened to undennine th,eir shop-noorpO\\'er. so clearly revealed in the Maritime Strike 
and its aftermath. However this shop-noor po\ver could not be turned into political innuence. 
Thi " 'as because. Holt argues. en1ployers '" 'ere unable to n1ake an alliance " 'ith rural interest 
and hence unable to derail the legi lation. 
Why did farn1crs not oppose arbitration- especially seeing that they \\'ere later to becon1e 
vehcrncrH critics and. a \Ve v.'ill shO\V, \Vere at every point crucial to the developn1ent of the 
H rbi tration systctn? ·rhcre is no \Vholly sa tis factory accou n l. :Holt clai n1s that representatives of 
rural electorates believed that the systen1 would not apply to fannlabourand hence aquiesced 
in the passing of the Act. Martin disagrees (Martin. l9X7). His account of the parlian1cntary 
debates suggests that rural representatives did believe that it vlould apply to their constituents. 
But it is then unclear fron1 Martin's account \vhy they did not oppose the n1easure.5 
l~lowever. there is n1orc to the pa~singofthe legislation than thevectorofclass and sectoral 
interests. As we argued above\ states n1atter- in the first place because of the ·goa) oriented 
activities of state officials· and in the second place. because •their organizational configura-
3 In a forthcoming paper~ we in tend to ex a rni ne critically Castles.theOI)' of\\relfare sta'le dcvelopn1ent 
in Australia and Nc'' Zealand. 
4 Castles does acknowledge the link!' between trade unions and the Liberal governn1cnt.links central 
to Holt's account. but the thrust of hi~ analysis is to discount their significance and to give 
ex pia na tory priority to unions· indus tria I strt>ngt h. 
5 \Ve suspect that further research will suggc~t ad ivergence between :Ia rg.e landowners. 'Nho en1ploycd 
a considerable an1ount of labour and fan1ily farn1ers who did not. Only the latter were critical to the 
Lih-Lah coHlition and it was their acquiescence which enabled the arbitration legislation to bccornc 
law. The large landowners opposed the legislation. vainly in the lower house. but uccessCully in the 
upper. until robbed of th·eir n1ajority there too. 
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tions ... encourage son1c kinds of group fonnation and coHective political actions (hut not 
others) and n1ake possible the raising ofcertain political issues (but not othersr (Sko~pol. 19X5 
p. 21}. Whereas Castles· analysis neglects both of these din1ensions .. l~olt takes seriously the 
first argun1ent but underplays the second. Like other observers. Holt en1phasises the inlpor-
lance of Reeves in initiating the legislation and in getting it passcd.l~hc novelty of his account is 
in showing that Reeves· success depended not. sin1ply on h.is energy and parlian1entary skill but 
also on the prevailing configuration of class and sectoral interests and capacities. The fonna-
tion of this configuration and the translation of the interest and capacities it represented into 
political power depended hO\\'ever. on aspects of state structure liulc cxarnined by Holt. l~hc 
creation of a party able to con1 n1and rnajoritics in parlian1cnt and hased on progran1 n1atic 
appeals to a fully en franchised e:lcctoratc \vas new.6 This n1ade poss·iblc the systernatic \Vorking 
through of a legislative agenda by the Liberal govern1nent. The content of the agenda in lurn. 
depended on the character oft he coalition that fon11ed the L·iberal govern rnent. This coalition 
detern1incd how interests outside ofpar'lian1ent \\'ere aggregated and balanced wilhin parl ·ia-
nl,ent: the discounting of 'the industrial power of en1ployers. the balancing of the industrial 
weakn~ss of the unions \\tith political inOuence. and the neutral ising of the opposition that 
n1ight have been expected fron1 son1e rural M Ps. This \\'as perh .aps as n1uch due to their desire 
to continue as participants in the coalition. as to their ignorance oft he possible in1pact. of the 
IC&A Act on rural labour or the gains they n1ight have hoped for fron1 industrial peace. In the 
Liberals· .first tenn labour MPs did not oppose land legislation: in the second~ rural M Ps did 
not oppose con1pulsory arbitration. 
The maintenance of the system 
Making sense of the arbitration syst~en1 requires n1aking sense of what \Ve call. ".Holl·s 
paradox·: that a systetn set up to solve one set of problen1s flourished by solving con1pletely 
different ones. Reeves· principle intention in sponsoring con1pulsory arbitration \vas t.o s top 
strikes and lock-outs. The use of conciliation boards and the Arbitration Court \vas intended to 
provide a rationalrneans of d·ispute setflen1ent. a civilised alternative to fht! atavistic approach-
es of Britain and other countries. It is true that there were no strikes or lock outs untill906: but 
the industrial \veakness of the unions n1ade this a 'likely otHcon1c even in the absence of the 
arbitration systen1. Indeed strikes resun1ed again once sorne unions felt strong enough to 
engage in dir.ect bargain in g. More to the point. the conflicts that the c·ourt resolved were for the 
n1ost part of the systen1's own n1aking. As 1-lolt puts it: 
. .. the arbitration systen1 syst.ern. in its early years. only occasionally provided the n1ean~ of 
settling disputes which had arisen fron1 a bargaining situation or a threatened strike or 
lockout. 'In n1ost cases the unions activated the arbitration n1achinel)' in order to initiate 
forn1al proceedings ·with en1ployers and often they only existed for that purpose. In a sense 
the arbitration systen1 created the disputes it then settled (p. 42). 
A.s this quotation suggests, the arbitration systen1 also largely created the organizations of 
unions and en1ployers \vho brought d:isputes to the court for its resolution. For the n1ost part 
these \verc not existing organizalions but ne\\¥ ones. created to fit the Acfs requiren1ents for 
registration. Such organizations did not have to adapt to the arbitration systen1. but gre\V fron1 
it and \Vilh it In Hoh's " 'ords: I 
A newvaricly of trade unionisn1 had appear~ed in New ZeaJand which owed its VCI)' existence 
to the Arbitration Act and which depended on the coercive po\\er oft he state to achieve it~ 
ends. The Arbitration Court had becon1e a tribunal charged not only \\'ith rcsol~Vingcon tlicts 
but with fixing n1ini·mun1 wages. maxin1um hours and conditions of employn1ent in ever-
growing areas of the privale sector. None of this could have happened without Reeve·s Act 
and in this sense Reeve·s experin1ent was a success. but it was the kind of success achieved hy 
the hunter who went out seeking wild boar and can1e back proutlly bearing a stag (p. 53). 
6 How the Liberals created and n1ai ntai ned their parlia tnenta ry and clecloral coal it ion has heen 1 inle 
explored. Lipson ( 194S). shows the striking stability of cabinets after 1891 -hut does not docu n1ent 
in any detail how this was ach ie\ ed. Othercon1 menta tors are equally rct ·iccnt ·(see Richardson. 19X 1. 
Sinclair. '1965 ). 
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The nature of the stag: organizations and their strategies 
HO\\' to go out for a boar and con1e back with a stag? Reeves seen1s to have thought that 
con1pulsory arbitration \\'Ould arncnd but not transfon11 the pattern of industrial relations. The 
state \\'Ould rule out sotne fon11s of influence and lin1it son1e conflicts. It would not however 
fundan1cntally allcr the dynatnics of the existing systen1: the parties would still settle n1ost 
disput~es by direct collective bargaining, underpinned by their respectiv~e levels of n1arket 
power. Instead. the developn1ent of the arbitration systen1 fundamentally transformed the 
nature and practice of industrial relations. 
Side by side \\' ith the existing n1arket based systen1. con1pulsory arbitration created an 
alternate ecology. based on the adn1inistrative and coercive n1achinery of the state. This 
alternate ecology provided ne\\' resources for the organization of en1ployer and union groups. 
for the de·finition of interests, the wielding of influence, the fran1ing of conni ~cts and the 
en:forcen1ent of their resolution. The processes it set in n1otion were en1bedded in tin1e. 
Participants discovered. not irnrnediately. but in an unfolding pattern. the resources n1ade 
available by the systen1 and the uses to which they could be put This unfolding. and the 
interplay bet\\'een the arbitration systen1~ the n1arket and political parties. generates and 
explains the course of industrial relations in Nevv- Zealand between 1894 and 1932- and for a 
long tin1e thereafter. 
Fron1 1894, union organizers and en1ployers had available tvlo broad strategies for ach-
ieving their goals . . As before. they could pursue a labour n1arket strategy based on the threat of 
strike or lockout and ain}ed at settling wages and conditions by direct negotiation. Alternately 
they could pursue a court-based strategy. arising fron1 the Court's recognition of the parties and 
based on the presentation of evidence before a tribunal charged with n1aking binding deter-
nYinations on \Vages and conditions. Which strategy seen1ed n1ost attractive varied Cor the 
parties over tin1e: \\'eakness in the labour rnarket could be balanced by the standing given by 
the Court \Vhile labour rnarket strength encouraged the avoidance of the Court and reliance on 
direct bargaining.7 The choice of strategies was of interest not only to the parties then1selves 
ho~'ever~ but also to outsiders: politicians. state officials. the public at large~ and especially 
farn1ers. \Vho believed their own interests dan1aged or enhanced in the process. Their choices, 
as rnuch of those oft he dir~ct participants, helped to detern1ine the outcomes of the strategies 
chosen. 
Unions 
Norn1ally. unions are reliant on the use of n1arket pO\\'er 'to \\'in concessions: en1ployer are 
forced to recognise and bargain \Vith unions on threat of strikes. Creating a credible strike 
threat depends upon the degree to which union n1ernbers can be n1obilised for co-ordinated 
action that threatens en1ploycr interests. As many theorists and n1any organizers have noted. 
trade unions encounter nun1erous obstacles in achieving this level of organization (Olson. 
1965: Offe. 1981 ). 
The attraction of the arbitration systen1 \Vas that it n1ade these considerations largely 
irrelevant to trade unions who wished to \Vork \Vithin it. Th ~e systen1 guaranteed unions 
ernployer recognition. provided a bargaining forun1 in which en1ployers were con1pelled to 
appear. and enforced rninin1un1 " 'ages and conditions according to the Courfs deternlina-
tions. All that \vas requir~ed \\'as registration under the Act. application to the Court for an 
av/ard and observance of the procedures for conciliation and arbitration. Any seven (later 15) 
workers could forn1 a union and activate this process. As \Ve have noted, the great bulk of 
unions regi tered under the Act " 'ere forn1ed precisely to take advantage of its provisions. their 
officials n1ore at. home in the courtroon1 than on the picket line. 
But circun1stances change and with then1 the attraction of alternate strategies to unionists . 
.In the \Vake of the Maritin1c Strike unions \Vere for the n1ost part \\' ~eak. disorganized or non-
existent. But after the turn of the century. and especially after 1905 (Olssen. 1987). the fortunes 
of nHtny unions revived and the levels of unionisation. particularly of unskilled workers 
rapidly increased. If the arbitration systen1 tnade organizing easy .. it also. it was increasingly 
7 These choices can be coded in Hirschman's terms as a choice between exit. voice. and as we wiJl 
show. loyalty (Hirschman. 1970). 
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,trgued. offered fcv. gains to \\'Orkcrs . .1-·e\\·er~ an}'\\ay. than the~ could \\in through dirt:cl 
ha rgain i ng \\ i th en1 ploycrs.l~hc r~" an.ls of opting out.. as opposed to ~tayi ng \\ ith in the S) ~tcn1. 
\\ere not ho\~cvcr cvcnl~ spread. All unions found their bargaining po\\cr affected by the 
business cycle. But \Vilhin thi~ broad constraint. unions diiTcrcJ tnarkcdly in the levels of 
organi1.ation they could tnu~tcr and the strategic p(lwer given to thcn1 by their position in the 
cconotny. ·1·or son1e unions their best strategy "~ould a)\\1ay~ be to stick \Vith the arbitration 
~ystcn1. \\ hih~ for others innovations in organization and tight labour n1arkcts \\Ould provide 
pressing incentives for opting out in favour of direct bargaining. 
l'he likelihood of staying" ithin the arbitration systen1 as opposed to opting out\\ as not 
hov-c~\er sirnply a rnan~erof~hoicc couplctl \\ith the appropriate pauern of incentive~. Llnion~ 
organized under the rubric of the arbitration y!)tcn1 " 'ere n1orc its tlependent clients than it 
independent judges. l~he internal organization required for the cfl~cti\c utilisation of the 
arl·ritration sy~tetn·s procedure did nol 'providc a ba i~ fort he 1nas~ 111obilisation of\\Orkcrs-
and vice-versa. Unions could not slide easily fron1 on ~e choice of ~trategy to another. l~hc ·ir 
pattern of organizalion rcprcsenled a lonn of sunk costs'' hich in1portantly constn~rined their 
choices. Even" hen the arbitration systcn1 \Vas not delivering. it could count on the grudging 
loyalty of such unions. son1etin1cs coupled with alletnpts to usc legislative e:H11endn1ents and 
other n1cans to in1prove the S)Stcn1's pcrforn1ance.l~his loyalty to the systen1 ho\vever signifi-
cantly u ndcnni ned the strateg·ics ofthosc unions ·who chose tu opt out as \\'as sho\\ n in 1912-13. 
~Or~ to put it in the Leleologica·ltcrnls favoured by sotne theorists and activiti!'lS. it undcnninetl 
the unity of the \\'Or king cia s. 
E 111 pI OJ •ers 
In the \\akc of the Maritin1c Strike. en1ployers. triun1phant in their dcployn1ent ofn1arket 
povver. opposed the lC&A Act. Nor did they have reason Lobe pleased by its operation. \Vorkcr~ 
soon disco\creu hO\\' the Act could be u eel to create unions. to force their recognition. and to 
ha u I en1ployers in to the Arbitration ( "ou rt \\,here clain1s for ,,·ages and conditions \\·ere su hject 
to binding arbitration. Moreover. in the face of bitter opposition frotn cn1ploycrs. they sought 
to usc the ~Court to enforce preference. But iflhe en1ploycrs· n1arkct po\ver \\as partly balanced 
by the rights accorded unions by the arbitration systern_ the nC\\ s -was not an bad. Typicall). the 
Court's a\vards recognised. rather than superseded the '''age and conditions already paid by 
good en1ployers- often on the basis of a consensus bct\veen the parties. In do,ing so the) 
effectively ruled out \\age con1petition an1ong en1ployers. pre\cnting the etnployers on one 
region being undercut ·in the pricing of goods and services b) those ip another. En1ployers 
consequently catne to usc the Court to bring theircon1petitor~ intu line.~ l)cspite the disco\'er~ 
of its use ho\\'Cver. the arbitration sy!)tenl seemed to n1any en1ploycr a' exatious intervention 
into their private affairs. 
But. just a for unions. so for en1ployers circun1 lances change. If the arbitration sysh~nl 
undern1incd the n1arket po\ver of cn1ployers at the litne of its greatest strength. so it could 
provide a shelter f ron1 the 1narkc1 strength of unions at ti n1cs of en1 ployer \Vt:a kness. En1 players 
faced such circun1stances after 1906 and again in the period fron1 the last years ofWorld War 1. 
until the first post-\var recession in 192L l~hey turned fron1 being opponents to allies of the 
arbitration systcn1. not least because they discovered its provisions could be used to isolate 
pO\\'erful unions and to ease the substitution of ne\v labour Cor those on strike. But the support 
\\aS r.evocable: en1ployers \vere to turn against arbitration as the rece ·sion oft he late l\\enlie 
deepened into depression. 
Outsiders: fanners 
Because of their \Vide in1pact the relationships bet\vccn un ·ions and cn1ployers attract~d 
n1uch n1orc general notice. Ofn1osl in1porta:nce. because of their key role in the econon1~ and 
their political organization. vvcrc fanners. Farn1er neulndity. as Holt sho\\S. V\as essc:ntialto 
the passing of the Act. Equally. an all iancc bet\vcen farn1crs and etn players evcntua ll) broug.lrt 
aboul the systen1~s abo'lition. Farn1er indiff~erence depended on a continuing s~nse that the 
arbitration systen1 did not affect then1. Initially this indifference could be secured sin1pl) b~ 
8 For examples. see Holt pp. 33-57. 
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excluding agricultural labour fron1 the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court - and was 
threatened by any sign of union organization in the sector. Later the ituation becan1e n1orc 
l:Oil1 plex. Fan11ers. togcther,vith other actors in the econon1y. came to u ndcrstand n1ore clearly 
the linkages bet\\'een agriculture. and non-tradeable sectors of the economy. In this n1orc 
so ph i~t icated understanding. and in the context of a squeeze on farn1 profits in the twenties. the 
arbilration systen1 can1e lo appear as a device for raising farn1 costs. 
The ~t'ider political conte>:t 
Stance to\\ ard the arbitration ysten1 depended only part1y on the Court's perforn1ance. 
Equa1ly in1ponant " 'ere th\; \\1ider pattern of political alliances and coalitions in which the 
participants \\'ere involved. Fan11t:rs. finding then1 elve in parlian1entary alliances \\'ith 
unionists. acquiesced to compulsory arbitration at the time of its introduction in 1894 and of its 
rebirth 111 1935. but \\'ere its n1o"t virulent critic in the 1920s. En1ployers began as opponent of 
the s)sten1. only to lind then1selves defenders of it first in allianc,e \Vith farn1ers in 1913 and 
brieny in an alliance \\'ith unions in the twenties. Finally hov;cver. as part of the price of 
cen1enting a larger urban-rural conservative coalition they turned away fron1 the systen1 aner 
191X. l"he point i also true of unions. l''he requiren1ents for creating a viable Labour party led 
to the n1odcrating of opposition to the arbitration ysh~nl and con1pron1ise arnong union~ on 
this i~ ue (01 sen, 1987). 
The precarious career of the arbitration system 
l~racing out the range of trategies. incentives and con traints bearing on the actors help~ 
n1ake clear the precariousne~ soft he ) sten1 and especial1y etnpha isc the need to explain hovl 
it could have urvived for. o long. l"hc explanation it is also clear. \\'ill have to be at two levels: 
th\; level of the arbitration systen1 and its particular operations and results. and a broader part~ 
pol itiL·a l 'level involving the ~rcation and ren1a king ofgove rn i ng co a I it ions. In \\'hat follows we 
look at both of these level~ to sec ho"' the systen1 \\'Orked in \vays that allO\\'ed its contin-
uanLC. 
In this ection our focu i on \vhat gol done through the arbitration systen1- and \\~th 
''hat con ·equencc ~ . The broad outline"' of our ans\ver arc already apparent. The arbitration 
y._ tcn1 '''as a rnuch about the Ina king of groups and the stn1cturing of relation. hip an1ong 
then1 a it\\ as about the setting of \vages or conditions. 
The Arbitration l 'ourt Ia) at the centre of the systen1' operation . Tracing it· cour cover 
tin1e allo\vs a focus on the process b) \\ lTich lhe systen1 \a.orked and an understanding of its 
p~rsi 'Lence and its precariousness. The Court"s decisions. in intended a \\ell a unintcndt:d 
vlays. \\ere the n1ost in11nediatc detern1inant not only of"'hat happened'' ithin the systcn1 but 
the degree of support or a ntagon i 111 for its operations generated outside of it Hoh·s focus on 
th~ detail oft he Court's op~ration is therefore extren1ely in1por1ant to understanding ho\v the 
systt: 111 operated. 
1894-1913 
I nitiall) the operations of the , ourt helped to develop the arbitrations~ stein and reinforce 
its O\\ n position "ilhin it. B~ folio\\ ing a strategy or levelling up\\ ages and conditions. the 
c_·ourt could encourage nc\~ I~ forn1ing unions\\ ithout greatly antagonising en1ploycr ·. By 
~teering around the potentially explosive is ue of preference. except v. here ernplo) cr and 
union~ agreed. the Court avoided an obvious area ofcontention.ln the abscnc~ of application. 
Cor registration by un .ions of farn1 labourers the sensitivities of the rural ect.or n!n1ained 
Ll n ru rned. 
By 1908 ho\vever_ the ('ou rt h<H.l arrived at its first crisis.\\ hich \\' a~ nol be he finally rcso'lvcd 
until 1913. The Court's O\vn pattern of decisions and their in1p'lications.lay at its heart. Most 
in1n1ediately.thc ("ourt's suc.:ccss in genenrting business. aided by the "Willis blot'. had clogged 
1lhe conciliation and arbitration procedure. creating nurnerou~ irritations ;~or unions and 
cn1plo)ers alike. The e difficultie \\ere largely dealt \\ilh by the rcfon11s spon orcd b) the 
Mini "lerofLabour.John Miller.l .. hc sub tance of the :rc;fonn · '"as hov.ever. ofles,. in1111ediatc 
i1nportance than the ,conlext in \Vhich it occurred. By '190R the n1o t pOYlerful and be t organ-
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i1cd unions \\ere in a~ti\~ rebellion frornthc s}stcnl. ''hilc farn1cr~ had joined cn1plo)'cr~ in 
thci ran tagon i~n1. Lcgi~lath ~ rcforn1 in this con text v. as a hrcl\ c al:t of hope. It~ i n1p~tu~ v. a~ the 
desire to n1;.dntain the original Liberal coalition of farnll'r~ and v.orkcrs and the institution~ 
this had spa" ned~ at a tin1c vvhcn the process of electoral Ji~solution \\as already .,, cllu ndcr 
v.a~. Not surpri~ing.l). as llnlt reports. Miller·~ rcforn1s v. ~cn~ ~arried out v.ith. 'little ardent 
support fron1 right. or left" (~Jolt. p. X7). llov. hall thi~ ~ituation con1c about'! 
For unions. the C'ourCs decisions can1c to carl) a double tncssagc. On the one hand. the 
('ourt rnadc union organilation sin1plc and guaranteed n1inin1un1 v.agc~ and condition~ for 
union n1cn1hcrs. On the other hand. it incrcasingl) lin1itcd the . ~ttlcn1cnts of ~trong union~ 
beiO\\ the lcvcb the) thought they could achieve in direct bargaining. The fir~t tne sage led to 
atten1pt~ to extend the ju:ri~diction of the ~Court~ the second to rebellions against it. 
The guarant~es offered by the ("ourt provided in1portant incentives for the organization of 
those n1o~t difficult of all v.·orkcrs to organize: agricultura'llahourers. But the prospe~t of an 
agricu hu rallabou rers union in1 rnediately antagonised fa rn1crs. By 190H lhc (~anterbu ry F arnl-
crs lin ion had affiliated \\ith lhc (~anterbury En1ployers Un .ion and den1andcd ofparlian1cn· 
tal) candidates that the) con1n1it thcn1sehcs to the repea 'l of the Act.l.he heat v.as only taken 
out of the issue ·v.~ h~n the Court finally declined to n1e:1kc an a\\ a rd. 
If son1c unions sought inclusion under the (~ourt's urnhrella. other~ chafed under its 
restrictions. The (~our(s decisions. once the initial stage of. 'levelling up· had taken place did 
nol provid ~c unions v.rith a share of their en1ploy~ers~ profits and. for "Of11C unions. rnay not C\ en 
have kept pace v.ith the co~t of living. In a tin1e of rising prosperity. and \\ith the increased 
levels and sophistication of union organiLation (\\ hich in part had been facilitated b~ the 
arhitnrtion sy ten1) the incentive for strong unions to st.rike out on their own pro\ed ovcr-
\Vhelnling. But the Red l .. eds· breakout as " 'ell as signalling the discontent of~on1e unions. also 
in1n1ediately din1ini hed the support for arbitration of those en1ployers and fanners\\ ho had 
seen in the S) stcn1. \vhatcver i·ts olher faults. a n1eans of preventing strikes. 
But if the \\'Orking of the s~ stern precipitated po\~lcrful opposit·ion. it also in the end. Holt 
shov.'S. helped guarantee its continuance. The division oflo) alties bet\\ecn unions v. ho bene-
fitted fron1 the systen1 and those " 'ho \vis heel lo escape ils pro~edur~es isolated and blunted the 
challenge fron1 below. Sin1ultaneously the threat ofn1ilitant labour. and the resources offered 
by the arbitration systen1to defeat it helped cetnent a nev.' a Ilia nee offarn1crs and ernploy~r~ in 
the sysh!n1· support. The resources \\'ere partly syn1bolic- the Red r~ eds could be portray~ed as 
n1ilitants unv,illing to \\Ork ,,.ilhin the rules of the gan1e and their strikes as unjustified- and 
partly organizational. The systen1 allo\ved ernployers to encourage arbitrationist union~ in 
\\'hich S'trikc breakers could be enlisted and offered the (~ourt"s proteclion. and it prevented 
strikers fron1 being assisted financially by unions registered under the Act. 
The end result \Vas the continuance of the systen1- but no\v under a political coalition of 
en1ployers and fanner represenl~ed by Refonn·s Yictory in 1913. The situation is nict!ly ~urn­
n1arised by Holt: 
\Vhilc the arhitrat.ion systen1 helped defeat the ~trikers and destroy the Reo Fed~ in 1 q 12-13. 
the strikes anu the Red Feds helped ensure t.he sun ival of arbitration. A r11~1jorit) in the 
union n1oven1ent had favour~cd arbitration all along and the failure of 1hc rc\'Oh only 
reinforced the conviction ... thal d:ircct confrontation bet\\een lahour and capital \\en: 
ruinous for working1ncn. The effect of the Red Fed epboue was to turn n1an) farn1er~. 
en1ployer and con ervativcs into chan1pions of arbitration too. The arbitration ysten1 had 
helped isolate the 111 ilitants and radical in the union n1ove1nent. u ndenninc the solidaril) of 
the workers on strike. and legitin1ise the strikc-hrea king acti' itics of the ernplo) er~. farn1crs. 
and non-union labour. The very fact that the arbitration syst~cn1 had been so bitterly attacked 
by the Red Feds rendered it n1ore appealing to those on the right" ho had fonnerly been its 
nutjor ~critics ... The arbitration system had sun'h ed the transition fron1 Seddonisn1 to 
Ma ~:)eyisrn thanks in large rneasure to the action:s of its n1ost viru 'lent opponents (Holt. p. 
'111-113). 
1913-1932 
The arbitration systern \\'as saved in 1913 by a con1bination of factors. A ne\\ supporting 
coalition of fanners and ernployers had en1erged. a coalition that onl) five years earlier had 
clarnoured for the systen1's abolition. But five years is a long tirne in the lit~ of the ,arbitnnion 
systen1. Farnlc:rs and en1ployers had carne to understand things they had not knov.n- rnore 
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in1 porta ntly. could not have knov.'n- in 1908. and they now appreciated what the system could 
offer then1. The resilience of the ystern .. especially the n1onopolistic and blanketjurisdication 
or registered unions. \Vas in1portant to .its survival. The san1e ease of registration that had been 
crucia I to the recovery of u n ionisrn after 1894 was turned against the challengers: it was as easy 
to find 15 scahs in 1913 as to find the sa n1e n u n1ber of unionists in earlier years. And. essential 
to the process \Vas the role of the Massey governn1ent .. both in tern1s of astute legislative 
an1cndn1ents 10 buure s the systen1 (the Police Offences Arnendn1ent Act and the Labour 
Disputes J nvestigation Act) and the use of ovenvheln1i ng physical coercion. 
Thi ~ latter a pect is a ren1inder both of the arbitration systen1·s dependence upon various 
fonns of state coercion. of \Vh ich Massey·s cossacks were at one repressive extren1e and the 
routine operation of the systern at the ot.her, and of the grin1 irony that in 1913 a court-based 
s_ stern \Vas ·in the end saved only by bitter street violence. This raises a key question: how did 
the systen1 get into such a n1ess. and \Vhat did its chief participants do over the next period to 
prevent thi happening again? 
The ans\ver to the fir t part of our question is apparent fron1 our preceding account Here. 
\Ve \~ill fonnali..e it in tern1s oft he state-centred approach outlined earlier. The organizational 
configuration and overall patterns of activity of the Arbitration Court in the pre- 1913 period 
gave it no routine " lay to resolve the problen1s that lay at the heart oft he Red Fed rebellion. Its 
fair \Vage policy " 'orked \Veil for first a\vards. but provided no ready basis for improving v.'ages 
in ubsequent cnvards. A profit-sharing approach was doubly ruled out by the occupational 
ba is of n1ost a\vards and the en1ployer hostility 'it \\'O:uld have provoked. A living wage 
approach based on the cost of living offered one possible solution. Holfs account n1akes it 
clear that follo,ving the Harvester deci ion_ such notions \vere part of the Court's calculations. 
But it could not forn1 a systen1atic basis for wage adjustrnent before 1913. The infonnation base 
\vas inadequate. Just as in1portant. the three yearly renevvals of awards " 'ould have created a 
lotte'l)' in \vhich the size of a \\'Orker's \\'age increase would be detennined by precisely when 
the a\vard \Vas settled. Fron1 the CourCs later pronouncernent . \\'hen it had resolved these 
proble1n ... and adopted a living \Vage policy. it is evident that these considerations weighed 
heavily \Vilh it The Court had never accepted jurisdiction over issues of rnanagerial preroga-
tive and labour process \,;Ontrol and so " las also poorly placed \Vith regard to the other issues 
\vhiLh \Vcrebound up in the Red Fed :rebellion(Olsscn.l987: Richardson. J987).Consequently 
the " 'orkers involved \Vere led by the structure and operation of the systein into patterns of 
group fornHltion and collective strategies that lay outside the arbitration systen1. 
l~he second part of our que .. tion- ho\v \Vere the sy ten1·~ partic·ipants able to prevent a 
repetition of 1913 - leads naturally to a further question. Why were the systen1-s participants. 
especially the Court. unable or unwil'ling to prevent its political abolition in 1932? Our analysis 
\Vill suggest a harsh irony. l "he changes in the organizational configuration of the systern and 
the patterns of activity " 'ithin ·it in this period. \vhich helped to prevent a further 1913. led 
directly to the systern·s abol·ition in 1932. And. v.'e note her·e a curious cycle. The attack on the 
systen1 at the end of each oft he e periods can1e fron1 those \vho at the stan oft he period seen1ed 
lo have rnost to gain frorn it1~here appears to be a sense in '\\'hich the n1en1bers of the Court 
alert to the chief sources of support and opposition. attend to the latter·sgrievances and devise 
solutions " 'hich anger their erstv.,hile supporters and lead to their defection. 
l "' he Arbitration Court changed its rnode of ope rat ion radically a rter 1913. Ho\vever th ·is did 
not occur in1n1ediatcly. Although the shock of lhe Red Fed challenge n1ust have n1ade an 
institulion as politically sensitive as lh·e Court consider ho\a.' be t to secure it future. the 
\Veakness and div:ision besetting union gave the Cou 11 sorne breathing pace. For the fir t tirne 
in its career. the ~Court enjoyed the 'luxury of the \vhole-hearted support and approval of 
politically and industrially dorninant coalitions (cn1ployers and fanners). The Court- and 
the Court or Appeal \Vith its ban on unqualified preference in 1916- consolidated their 
support \Vith a series of decisions over the next fev~' years that ''lere unfavourable to unions.9 
l "he Court \Vas only con1pelled into areas essrnent of its approach by the problen1s of\\'artirne 
inflation. Like the Red Fed challenge. these expo ed the lin1itations of the Cour1· procedure. 
l)espill' its reCOJ11111L'IH.lation to ernpJoyers to follO\V its policy or bonuses. the Court. still tied 
into three year C:nvards, was unable to ensure that \\'ages kept pace " 'ith the cost of living. Tht: 
result " 'as a dratnatic increase in industrial rnilitancy and bargaining outside the systcn1 by 
unions \Vho \vcn.:: confident oftheiro\vn resources and rnarket po\:ver. Unions dependent on the 
systen1 \vere unable to pursue uch options and they bccan1e incrca ·ingly en1bittered. 
() l-I olt. pp. 122-126. offers rna ny examples. 
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l he arbitration sy~ten1 sut"\ i\'cd this tc~t because its organiLational configuration and 
paucrn ofacti\'ity changed to den I \\ith these prohlen1s.l~hc in1pctus can1c fron1 the Govcrn-
n1ent \vhich \\as \\'eary of the political strife it\\ as getting into in its role of chief industrial 
n1cti'ia tor. solving the disputes the syst,cn1 could not ha ndlc. In 191 X. it gave the(" ou rl flO\\Cr to 
an1end awards during their currency and to do so on the basis oft he cost ofJiving.l.he t~ourt. 
gi\'cn a politil'allead~ took the n1attcr further. Intriguingly. Holt's ac~ount sho\\'S that in March 
19 19.thc en1ployer representative on the C'ourt was vital in convincing a r~luctantjudgc to give 
a substantial increase to trade~anen. Encouraged b) this sho\\ of political and industrial 
up port for such an approach. the ( '"ourt decided in the follo\\ ing rnonth to in traduce Sta nJa rJ 
\Vagc Pronounccn1cnts (S\\'P ' )and announced that it \'fOuld i sue six n1onthl) bon use. to the 
s"·p rate based on cost of living figures supplied by the Governn1cnt Statistician. 
These dcvcloprnents \vere crucial to the '~utu re developn1cn toft he a rhitration S) ten1. In the 
hort tcrn1. the ·introduction ofS\\' Ps reassured craft unions that their \\ages and their statu~ 
\\Ould be preserved by the ( 'ourt. l "his \\a~ highly significant in vie\\ ofthe,ir grO\\'ing unhap-
piness at this tin1e. It shored up the support of craft unions and SlC,l:red then1 to strategies 
oriented around preserving the skill rnargins established by the S\\' Ps. It also suggested to 'the 
n1 ·ilitant unions- '"'ho \\Crc never al\:vays and ever)'\lVhere rnilitanl- that the Court n1ight 
adopt a n1ore flexible approach to cost of living issues. In other \\'Ords. the changes n1adc 
possible the rai. ing of certain issues and the adoption of certain strategies that had been 
prcviou ly ruled out by the structure and policies of the ~Court. 
The longer tern1 in1plical.ions \vcre profound. The use ofSWP created a hierachy of\vages 
ba ctl on level ofskil'l that becan1e the central consideration in all \\age-fixing and set trict 
lin1ils to fhe kinds of argun1ents that \vere relevant in \\age-fixing. 1-his consolidated the 
Courfs predon1inanoe overConcilia'tion Councils about'" hich the c·ourt had been concerned 
in the past. It established the Court finally as a national \\age-fixing tribunal. a role it had 
played 'lo son1e degree before but was nO\\' clearly visible to and accepted by alL including the 
Court. It operated as a court could be expected to operate. treating al'l group · the san1e.locating 
then1 \Vi thin the con1p'lex net~'Ork of relativities it had developed. In doing so. il had solved its 
pre- 1913 problen1. h nO\\' knew hov., to settle any award. 
l 'he Governrnent. en1ployers and f'arn1ers \Verc presun1ably pleased with this on the \vho.le. 
The in1petus for restoring the systen1 had con1e fron1the first t\VO oft he" e. and although~ as Hoh 
uggcsls. they grun1bled a little about specifics. they had overall got what they \\·anted. But as 
\Vith so rnuch that is in1por1ant about the arbitration syste:rll, the full in1plications of the 
changes \\'ere revealed over tirne. As\\ e have noted earlier. iive years is a long tin1e in the life of 
the arbitration system. By the n1id 1910s the econorny. especially the exporting sector\\ a .. in 
drarnatic decline. Farn1ers c'lan1oured for 'Nage reductions. But \\'hen the Court can1e to 
consider t\vo 3\\'ards fundan1ental to the cost structure oft he farn1 sector. the econon1ic decline 
of that sector and the rapid decline in the t,errns of trade \\'ere not decisive argun1ents. In the 
shearers· a\vard in 1926 and the freezing \\'Orkers· a\\'ard in 1927. the Court accepted as decisive 
argun1ents based on cost ofliving and on rc1ativity~rith other groups of\\orkers. The \\'heel had 
carne full circle. 
l ·he arbitration systen1 no\v prohibited or rendered rutile argun1ents \Vhich farn1er sa\\ as 
cruciaL and offered then1 no ready strategy w:ithin the systern to ren1edy this. Their response 
\\'as to pre s for political change and for an end to the systen1. This required a shift fron1 sectoral 
politics lo class politics. The arbitration systen1 was about sectoral interests and alignn1,ent . 
The sectoral interests of en1ployers were \\'ell se·rved by the systcn1, fanners believed at 'their 
expense. and in son1e degr,ee in alliance " 'ith \\'Orkers. (Fanners have al\\'ays believed in \Vhat 
Muldoon called the ·unholy alliance·). Employers " 'ere only prepared to abandon 'that sec-
'toral, advantage and unite \\'ith farn1ers against arbitration in circun1. tances \\'here class 
politics eclipsed sectoral alliances. l~his \Va achieved in the political realignn1ents bet\\·een 
1927 and 1932. 
Conclusions 
Holt's book is a n1ajor contribution to the analysis of the role of state and tnarket in the 
structuring of class in Ne\\' Zealand. We have tried to n1ake h 'is account n1ore theoretically 
expliciL en1phasising the state centred approach that he takes, but \\'ithout '\\'e think. departing 
fron1 th,e spirit or intent of his work. 
The origins oft he arbitration systernlay less in the advocacy oflabou r. pressed fron1 outside 
ofparlian1et1t .. than in the new n1eansoforganizingand hold.ingpolitical po\\reren1bodied in 
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the Liberal party and its coalition. coupled \Vith the advocacy of William Pember Reeves. The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act was only one of a large number of measures 
pushed through parlian1ent by the Liberals. Like the others. it was designed to n1obilise and 
channel the party's constituency offarn1ers and workers. Changes in the political system. their 
consequences for \vho held power and for how that power would be used. are therefore 
i11 ~parahle fron1 an understanding of the origins of the arbitration system. 
But once in place. as Holt shows. the sy..sten1 had a career of its own" with consequences 
quite different fron1 those intended by Reeves. These flowed fron1 the way the Act created new 
resources for the building of union and en1ployer organizations and for the structuring of 
relations among then1. 
The resources derived fron1 access to the state's n1eans of adn1inistration and coercion .. 
rather than directly fron1 the labour market. They were attractive precisely because they offered 
the vleaker party in the labour rnarket a n1eans of redressing the balance with the stronger. 
But th ~e systen1·s surv:ival depended as n1uch on the insurgencies it fostered as on the 
incentives for confonnity it prov·ided. By excluding direct bargaining. it channelled son1e 
unions into challenging the ysten1 at the san1e tin1e as it v~ested the interests of other unions in 
the systetn·s continuance. By isolating insurgent unions. the systern helped undern1ine the 
\_;hallengcs its own structure generated. Unions bound into arbitration actively opposed rebel-
lion. and farn1ers and en1ployers came to support the systen1 and ensure its survival. 
1"he survival of the systen1 also has to be seen in the larger context of party con1petition and 
\_;oalition. At different tiines parlian1entary support for the systen1 was prernised on coalitions 
of farn1er " and \VOrkers. farn1ers and ern players. and after the latter coalition had acted to 
abolish \Vhat it had previously supported. a rebirth brought about by a new farn1er and \Vorker 
electoral coalition represented in the 1935 victO.I)' of Labour. This pattern of support and 
opposition reflected the exigencies of the electoral systen1 and parlian1entary coalitions as 
tnuch a any fixed pattern of sectoral or class intere t. 
The evt:nts constituting the systen1 and explaining its persistence frorn one period to the 
next~ unfolded in tirne. Frorn one point of vie\\'. they represent possibilities always present in 
the institutional structure created hy the Act Fron1 another~ they reveal the creative discovery 
of strategies by the different partil:!s. as they struggled for advantage within and son1etin1es. 
outside of the systen1. While both vievls are necessary. the second offers the n1ore helpful 
st,u1ing place. Institutional structures. their boundaries. resources and crucial relationships 
are ahvays as n1uch discovered overtitne. as known all at once. The point is as true for observers 
and analysts as it is for participants. Getting to knO\V the set of relationship that underpins and 
explains the events being analy ed requ.ire clo. e attention to hO\\' those events are related 
across tin1c. Consequently. narrative and structural analysis arc necessarily intertwined. 
de· pile the atternpts n1ade by son1e historians and social scientists to hive off one or other as 
their special province. 
Because structures persist there is an itnportant sense in which events can repeat thenl-
elves. The even ls or 1951 are not so dissin1 i lar frorn those of 1912/13: and the pattern of'labou r 
\VCakness on the shop-lloor. coupled \\'ith an in1portant degree of political influence .. is as 
uscfu 1 a characterisation oft he situation u ndcrpi n ning the 1987 La hour Relations Act .. as oft he 
I X90s. Less controversially. the legacies of union structure and \::tnployer-union relation have 
significantly shaped the '''Orking of other Ne\v Zealand inst'it.utions. But the real contenlpo-
raneity of Hall's book lit:s less in the legacies it describes than in its approach: the careful 
blending of narrative and analysis to uncover the \VOrking of a key Ne\\' Zealand institution. 
vVe are al.l in hi debt. 
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